Plaintiff Dawn Rutherford was an employee of Scene 7, Inc. She was covered for long-term disability benefits under defendant Scene 7, Inc. Long Term Disability Plan ("Plan"). In August 2001, she initiated a claim for long-term disability benefits based on her diagnoses of fibromyalgia and depression. The Plan provided benefits through August 2003, but terminated benefits at that time, pursuant to a determination by defendant Prudential Insurance Company of America ("Prudential"), the claims administrator and insurer for the Plan. Ms. Rutherford undertook several levels of appeal, and Prudential (collectively with the Plan referred to as "Defendants"), the Plan insurer, affirmed the termination of benefits in July 2004, November 2006, and July 2007.

Defendants' Statement:

Defendants contend the decision to terminate plaintiff's long term disability benefits was

Defendants contend the decision to terminate plaintiff's long term disability benefits was correct. Plaintiff's long term disability benefits were terminated because it was determined plaintiff was no longer disabled from performing the material and substantial duties of her regular occupation. The medical evidence pertaining to plaintiff did not support a functional impairment precluding plaintiff from working in her regular occupation.

The Administrative Record shows that plaintiff was not eligible for coverage pursuant to the terms of her Plan and defendants' decision was proper.

The disputed factual issue is whether plaintiff satisfied the Plan's definition of disability as of the date of denial of the claim for benefits.

(3) Legal Issues

Plaintiff's Statement:

Plaintiff anticipates legal disputes in this matter concerning the determination and application of the standard of review to be applied to the denial of benefits. Ms. Rutherford believes review should be *de novo*, inasmuch as the language of the underlying group disability insurance policy does not confer discretion on Prudential to determine eligibility for benefits; such language is found only in a separate document styled "ERISA Statement" which expressly provides it is "not part of the Group Insurance Certificate." Ms. Rutherford believes that, assuming review is to be deferential, the termination of her benefits constituted an abuse of

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Evidence Preservation

Plaintiff's Statement:

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| | discretion pursuant to Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2006) (en | | |
| | banc). She anticipates issues relating to the appropriate scope of evidence to be considered by | | |
| | the court in its deliberations, and whether the scope of evidence is necessarily confined to the | | |
| | administrative record as produced by Prudential. She notes as well that the Supreme Court is | | |
| | scheduled to hear oral argument in MetLife v. Glenn, Supreme Court docket number 06-923, in | | |
| | ate April, and that the decision in that case, presumably forthcoming sometime this summer, | | |
| | could materially impact the analysis of the proper standard of review and the scope of evidence | | |
| | the court might consider. | | |
| | Defendants' Statement: | | |
| | The Plan has discretionary language which is part of the entire ERISA Plan. Defend | | |
| | contend the court should review defendants' decision to terminate benefits for abuse of | | |
| | discretion. | | |
| | These issues can be addressed concurrently with the hearing on the merits. | | |
| | (4) Motions | | |
| There are no prior or pending motions. | | | |
| | Plaintiff's Statement: | | |
| | Ms. Rutherford anticipates this matter will be resolved via cross-motions for summary | | |
| | judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or alternatively via cross- | | |
| | motions for judgment pursuant to Rule 52. There may also be discovery motions related to | | |
| | requests to be made by plaintiff. | | |
| | Defendants' Statement: | | |
| | Defendants contend there are no motions to be filed in this action. The action should be | | |
| | tried on cross trial motions based on the evidence contained in the Administrative Record. | | |
| | (5) Amendments of Pleadings | | |
| | The parties do not anticipate adding or dismissing any parties, claims, or defenses, or | | |
| | otherwise amending the pleadings absent some change in controlling law. | | |

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Ms. Rutherford has not destroyed any evidence in her possession or control relevant to the issues reasonably evident in this action. As an individual plaintiff, she has no document-destruction program or other ongoing systematic erasures of e-mails, voice mails, and the like.

Defendants' Statement:

Defendants contend the relevant evidence to this action is contained in the Administrative Record. In any event, Defendants have not destroyed, and will not destroy, relevant evidence.

(7) Disclosures

Plaintiff's Statement

The parties have met and conferred, and Plaintiff will make initial disclosures pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at a date prior to the filing of a responsive pleading by the Plan, which is due April 24.

Defendants' Statement:

Defendants contend initial disclosures are not required because this action will be tried on the Administrative Record only. Defendants will produce the Administrative Record by April 24.

(8) Discovery

No discovery has been taken to date.

Plaintiff's Statement:

Ms. Rutherford maintains that discovery is appropriate and should be allowed into a variety of issues which bear on the question of the proper application of the judicial standard of review as established by *Abatie*, *supra*, and similar authorities; the Supreme Court decision in *Glenn*, *supra*, may also impact the scope of discovery. Plaintiff anticipates there will be a need for judicial resolution of discovery issues on which agreement has not been, and is not likely to be, achieved.

Defendants' Statement:

Defendants contend there is no basis to conduct discovery and the court should not permit any additional discovery. *Newman v. Standard Ins. Co.*, 997 F.Supp. 1276, 1280-1281 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

| (9) | Class Actions |
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Not applicable.

(10) Related Cases

There are no related cases or proceedings pending before another judge of the court or before another court or administrative body.

(11) Relief

Plaintiff's Statement:

Ms. Rutherford seeks recovery of disability benefits under the Plan pursuant to 29 USC §1132(a)(1)(B). Based on currently available information she approximates benefits to date at \$174,000, with benefits continuing to accrue at the approximate rate of \$3,137 per month. She also seeks an injunction under 29 USC §1132(a)(3) enjoining Prudential from violating ERISA and its enabling regulations with respect to requests for documents pertinent to administrative appeals of adverse benefit determinations. Ms. Rutherford also seeks pre- and post-judgment interest, and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 29 USC §1132(g).

Defendants' Statement:

Plaintiff is not entitled to receive future long term disability benefits under the terms of the Plan. Under the Plan, plaintiff is only entitled to benefits so long as she is disabled. The court cannot make any determination of future benefits, because of the availability of sedentary employment for plaintiff and technological advances that allow gainful alternative employment.

Defendants seek judgment in their favor on all claims and reserve the right to seek fees under 29 USC §1132(g).

(12) Settlement and ADR

The parties believe settlement discussions could be productive, and suggest a referral to mediation.

(13) Consent to Magistrate Judge for All Purposes

The Plan does not consent to have a magistrate judge conduct all further proceedings.

(14) Other References

The parties do not consider this matter to be suitable for reference to binding arbitration,

a special master, or the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.

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(15) Narrowing of Issues

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None at this time. The parties will continue to consider, and meet and confer on any issues that arise which may streamline trial of this matter.

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(16) Expedited Schedule

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The parties do not believe the case could be practicably expedited beyond the typical time frame for resolution of cases involving disputed entitlement to ERISA benefits.

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(17) Scheduling

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The parties do not anticipate expert testimony, and therefore do not request a schedule for designation of experts or expert discovery. The parties request a trial date within one year of the

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filing of the complaint, which was filed December 20, 2007. The parties request that all other

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deadlines be set in accordance with this court's custom and practice.

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(18) Trial

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Plaintiff's Statement:

15 16 Plaintiff anticipates a bench trial, or alternatively cross-motions for summary judgment or for judgment under Rule 52, the hearing for which should be completed within one day.

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Defendants' Statement:

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Defendants contend the streamlined procedures applicable in an ERISA trial should

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apply. An ERISA trial does not involve the normal parameters of a typical trial. See *Kearney v.*

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Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1094-1095 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The parties agree trial is

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not by jury, but to the bench. Defendants do not anticipate calling live witnesses or experts, and

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any testimonial evidence submitted will be in the form of declarations. The only documentary

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evidence presented will be the Administrative Record.

Defendants contend the matter should be decided on the parties' trial briefs and the

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Administrative Record, and any additional evidence which may be permitted. Defendants

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request the simultaneous exchange of opening trial briefs followed by responding trial briefs for

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this matter. Kearney, supra, 175 F.3d at 1090.

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Richard Johnston will try the case for plaintiff, and Ronald Alberts and/or Tad Devlin will try the case for Defendants. 3 The parties agree the pretrial filings normally required, such as pretrial conference 4 statements, are unnecessary. The parties specifically request a waiver of the Rule 16 pretrial 5 conference and related pretrial requirements, pursuant to Ninth Circuit precedent. 6 (19)Disclosure of Non-party Interested Entities or Persons 7 The parties are not aware of any other non-party interested entity or person. (20)Other matters 9 Defendants request the court vacate and reset the case management conference hearing 10 set for April 10, 2008 in this action because Defendants' response to the complaint is not due until April 24, 2008. Defendants request the initial case management conference be set for a date, convenient with the court, after the case is at issue. 12 13 DATED: April 3, 2008 14 By /s/ Richard Johnston 15 Richard Johnston 16 Attorney for Plaintiff DAWN RUTHERFORD DATED: April 3, 2008 18 GORDON & REES LLP 19 20 By /s/ Tad A. Devlin Ronald K. Alberts Tad A. Devlin Attorneys for Defendants 22 24